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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent filed this action in the District Court 
in November, 1978 seeking rec~gnition of the Mexican divorce 
obtained by Respondent and Appellant in 1972 and seeking an 
order declaring a 1973 Settlement Agreement as the valid 
property settlement as between the parties. Record on Appeal 
p. 0003. Appellant, by way of her Amended Answer, admitted 
the Mexican divorce but alleged that the Settlement Agreement 
was unfair, unconscionable, and inadequate with regard to the 
provisions for child support and the division of the marital 
property. Record on Appeal, p. 0017, 0018. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A trial was held on November 28, 1979. Judgment 
was filed on January 16, 1980 awarding Appellant custody of 
the parties' three minor children and child support of $100.00 
per month per child. In addition, judgment was entered in favor 
of the Respondent as to the Settlement Agreement, with the 
District Court holding it to be valid between the parties for 
the reason that the Appellant had "abandoned any action to void 
said agreement or, by her conduct, having been estopped from 
asserting any claim for voidance thereof." Record on Appeal, 
pp. 0049-0050. This later portion of the Judgment is the 
subject of this appeal. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment below 
insofar as it held her to be totally estopped from seeking an 
equitable distribution of the~marital property any different 
than that contained in the Settlement Agreement. Appellant 
further seeks a remand of this matter to the District Court for 
a full hearing and equitable distribution of the marital 
property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Melvin J. Abbott and LaRae Victor, now known as LaRae 
Parkes, were married on August 15, 1959 in Salt Lake City. Ther 
were four children born to the marriage, of whom three are still 
minors in Appellant's custody. Record, p. 0045. For nearly 
eight of the years between 1962 and 1972 the parties lived in 
Duchesne County at the dairy farm of Mr. Abbott's father. 
During that time the Appellant took care of the farm household, 
cooking meals and cleaning for the children, Mr. Abbott, her 
brother-in-law and her father-in-law. Record, p. 0102; Transcri: 
at 36. 
During the course of the marriage the parties 
purchased numerous parcels of real property, some suitable for 
farming or pasturing and some valuable for its oil, gas or 
mineral rights. Testimony of Melvin Abbott, Record, p. 0124-012~ 
Tr. at 63. In 1966 Mr. Abbott purchased a half-interest in his 
father's dairy farm at a cost of $1,200 each year until his 
father's death. Also purchased were the farm's livestock and 
equipment and dairy stock. Record, p. 0127-0129; Tr. at 61-63. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization pr vided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The real estate and personal effects held at the time of the 
parties' divorce, and their values, are detailed in the 
Respondent's Answers to Interrogatories, Record, pp. 0027-0032. 
The parties obtained a M~·xican divorce in September, 
1972 which did not contain provisions as to child support or 
property division. During the year following the divorce, the 
parties discussed reaching a property settlement. Record, pp. 
0105-0106; Tr. at 39-40. Mr. Abbott retained an attorney, David 
Sam, to draw up a formal agreement. The Appellant, who was not 
represented by separate counsel, met once with Mr. Abbott and Mr. 
Sam but did not reach an agreement at that time. Record, p. 0113; 
Tr. at 47. Mr. Abbott presented to Appellant a written settlement 
agreement on October 10, 1973 and the parties signed it on that 
date. Record, p. 0106, 0113; Tr. at 40,47. 
By the terms of this Settlement Agreement the Appellant 
received custody of the parties' minor children and child support 
of $50.00 per month per child. She received as her separate 
property a 1971 LTD and a 14' x 68' mobile home. Mr. Abbott 
received as his separate property: 
334 shares of General Dairies, Inc. Class D stock 
159 shares of Hi-Land Dairy Class A Stock 
454 shares of Hi-Land Dairy Class C Stock 
1965 Ford F-350, serial number 35DR673322 
1963 Cadillac Deville, serial number 63Bl53075 
1955 Ford Fairlane, serial number $5RT135931 
Hydroswift Boat, serial number TC125J, Utah license #402 
Suziki Motorcycle, serial number 16195 
Cemetery lot, Block 11, Lot 7, Duchesne City cenetery 
1256 Base permit from Hi-Land Dairy Corporation 
Livestock: 40 cows, 20 two year olds, 10 one year olds, 
40 range cattle, and 30 one year old cattle 
Forest Permit for 89 head of cattle in Sowers Canyon 
-3-
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In addition; Mr. Abbott received numerous parcels of realty, 
the fixtures and improvements thereon, the water rights, and the 
mining interests. These properties are described in full in 
the Settlement Agreement, Record at pp. 0008-0009, and in Mr. 
Abbott's Answers to Interrogatories, Record at pp. 0027-0032. 
At the time of this Settlement Agreement, the Appellant 
had been remarried for two months. She was about to move to 
Singapore with her new husband and she signed the document only 
a day or two before her departure. Record, p. 0106; Tr. at 40. 
Mr. Abbott was anxious to have the Agreement signed, and had 
told the Appellant that she received more by its terms than she 
would get if the parties went to court about it. Record, pp. 
0107, 0115. 
In 1977 the Appellant secured an attorney to represent 
her whose services were paid for through the local Assistance 
Payments office. She filed suit in the fall of that year, seekin 
equitable distribution of the marital property belonging to her 
and Mr. Abbott in Victor v. Abbott, No. 6320 (District Court, 
Duchesne County), including modification of the 1973 Settlement 
Agreement. 
In August 1978 Mr. Abbott's attorney filed a motion 
to strike Appellant's complaint in Civil No. 6320 for her failure 
to appear at a deposition. A copy of that motion is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. Appellant's counsel in that action failed 
to respond to that motion and her complaint was stricken and 
ordered dismissed without prejudice on September 25, 1978. A 
-4-
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certified copy of that order is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
In November 1978 Mr. Abbott filed the instant action 
seeking recognition of the Mexican divorce and an order approving 
the Settlement Agreement as the valid distribution of the marital 
.. 
property. Record, pp. 0001-0009. A trial was held on November 
28, 1979, at which time the District Court heard argument as to 
whether or not the doctrine of equitable estoppel would apply to 
prevent the Appellant.herein from challenging the Settlement 
Agreement and seeking a different distribution of the marital 
property. Record, pp. 0079, 0085-88, 0095-96, 0140. In its 
ruling dated January 2, 1980 the District Court took judicial 
notice of the previously dismissed civil action and held that the 
Appellant is estopped to challenge the Settlement Agreement, 
having abandoned the prior action. Record, p. 0044. This was 
incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Record pp. 0045-0048, and into the Judgment, Record pp. 
0049-50. Appellants' objections to these findings were denied. 
Record, p. 0054. 
Appellant appeals from the Judgment entered in this 
matter only as to the issue of the Settlement Agreement. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The District Court erred in holding that the 
Appellant is barred from challenging the 1973 Settlement 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Agreement because her earlier lawsuit (Victor v. Abbott, Civ. 
\ 
No. 6320 Fourth District Court, Duchesne County) was dismissed 
without prejudice on September 25, 1978, two months before the 
conunencement of the instant action. 
2. There is insuff~pient evidence to support the 
finding of the District Court that the Appellant is by her 
conduct estopped from seeking a distribution of the marital 
property other than that contained in the 1973 Settlement 
Agreement. 
3. The District Court erred in failing to make an 
independent equitable distribution of the marital property 
with the 1973 Settlement Agreement as one factor to be 
considered. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT, 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
ABANDONMENT. OF A CLAIM RAISED THEREIN 
SO AS TO ESTOP THE APPELLANT FROM 
RAISING THE CLAIM AS A DEFENDANT IN A 
SUBSEQUENT ACTION 
Rule 4l{b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherWi~specifies,a-dismissar-under this 
subdivision ... operates as an adjudication on 
the merits. 
-6-
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U.R.C.P 4l(b) (emphasis added). The case law in Utah and other 
jurisdictions is clear that the effect of a dismissal without 
prejudice is the discontinuance of the complaint. See, e.g., 
Power Train Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1976); 
Although numerous courts have.-pddressed the issues of estoppel 
or res judicata in cases invloving prior dismissals with 
prejudice, few have had to resolve the issue of the estoppel 
effect of a dismissal without prejudice. 
The reason for this is apparent - most courts have 
recognized that the doctrine of estoppel is totally misplaced 
in the context of a dismissal where there has been no deterrnin-
ation of facts or adjudication on the merits of a plaintiff's 
complaint. Wright and Miller explain the difference between 
dismissals with and without prejudice in terms of their effects 
on the ability of the dismissed party to raise the same claim or 
litigate the same facts later. 
Even though the dismissal is with prejudice, 
if no facts have been adjudicated, as when 
the dismissal is for want of prosecution, the 
judgment, though a bar to a second suit on the 
same claim, does not establish any facts to 
which the doctrine of collateral estoppel can 
be applied in later litigation on a different 
claim. 
Wright & Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure 231. 
On the other hand, a dismissal without prejudice carries with it 
no estoppel consequences; it "creates no problem and a second suit 
is not barred." Id. at 233; Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver, su~ra. 
In the instant case, Judge Sorensen took judicial noticE 
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of the fact that Appellant had filed an action in 1977 seeking 
an equitable distribution of the marital property. He also took 
notice that the previous action had been dismissed without 
prejudice in September 1978 because she had failed to attend her 
deposition. In his ruling, however, Judge Sorensen turns this 
fact into a finding that she had abandoned her challenge to the 
Settlement Agreement and, therefore, is estopped to raise it in 
the instant case. Record, p. 0044. 
In the aforementioned Ruling, and in the subsequent 
Findings and Judgment of the District Court, it is apparent that 
"action " forming the basis for the estoppel is the Appellant's 
failure to appear at a deposition and the subsequent dismissal 
of her complaint. This leap was made by the Court without even 
hearing testimony from the Appellant as to the circumstances 
surrounding the dismissal of her complaint. 
For purposes of this appeal, however, it is only 
important that, for whatever reasons, Judge Bailif ordered her 
prior suit dismissed without prejudice. Exhibit B. Appellant ha 
no intention of arguing about whether that order, in Civil No. 
6320, should or should not have been entered. But the holding of 
the court below, if allowed to stand, results in the transforrnati 
of a dismissal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice. 
It is hard to imagine how the Appellant could be any more pre-
judiced than she was by the holding below that her dismissal with· 
out prejudice in the other suit is now an absolute bar to her 
raising a challenge to the Settlement Agreement by which her 
husband received the bulk of their marital property. 
-8-
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This rcsul t is nonsensic,\l, cont r.1 i·y to the law, and 
'\ 
patently unjust to the Appellant. As this Court stated in 
Power Train, Inc., supra: 
The dismissal of an action, although 
without prejudice, 9onstitutes an 
abatement for the ti~e being .... A 
dismissal not only postpones the 
action as a stay might have done, it 
discontinues the complaint completely, 
so as an entirely new suit must be 
instituted to bring the cause before 
the court again. 
550.P.2d at 1294, citing Fitch v. Whaples, 220 A.2d 170 (Maine 
1966). Thus, LaRae Parkes could have filed another complaint 
identical to the one dismissed in Civil No. 6320, if Mr. Abbott 
had not beat her to it. However, the District Court holding 
herein barred her from raising the identical claim as a 
defendant she could have raised as a plaintiff. The fact that 
the court applies the labels of "abandonment" and "estoppel" to 
her act of being dismissed does not change anything; the 
appellant was severely prejudiced by the court's use of an order 
that is supposed to be without prejudice. This distortion of the 
law and Rule 4l(b) should be reversed. 
II. THE EVIDENCE IS TOTALLY INSUFF~IENT 
TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT 
IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING AN EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIES' MARITAL 
PROPERTY. 
In J.P. Koch, Inc. v. ~-~·Penny Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 
903 (Utah 1975}, this Court articulated the test for the 
invocation of the doctrine of estoppel as 
-9-
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whether there is conduct, by act or 
omission, by which one party knowingly 
leads another party, reasonably acting 
thereon, to take some course of action, 
which will result in his detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted 
to repudiate or deny his conduct or 
representation. 
Id. at 905, citing Kelly v. Richards, 93 P.2d 731 (Utah 1938). 
See also Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976 
Leaver V. Grose, No. 16477 (Utah Supreme Court, decided April 2, 
1980). 
The appropriateness of this doctrine to the case at bar 
is questionable, at best. Assuming, arguendo, that a divorced 
spouse could be estopped from challenging a property settlement, 
this record is devoid of evidence to support such a finding. 
The court's Findings, Judgment and Ruling make no mention of any 
action of Appellant, other than her action in having her prior 
complaint dismissed without prejudice. Record, pp. 0044, 0046-4. 
0049-50. Presumably, it is, therefore, this act which the court 
found as the basis for its holding that she is estopped because 
she abandoned her claim. There is no testimony about any of her 
actions between the signing date of the Settlement Agreement and 
the dismissal of her suit. There are conflicting representation~, 
of counsel as to why she was not present at her deposition, but 
surely the Respondent could not claim detrimental reliance merel] 
on her failure to appear at a deposition, whether justifiable or 
not. 
The position of the Respondent adopted by the District 
Court apparently is that Appellant is estopped to challenge the 
fairness and equity of the Settlement Agreement because he relied 
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on its validity. The court was requested t') inquire intt> both 
the validity and the fairness of the agreement and make a fair 
distribution of the property. That judicial scrutiny was never 
entered into because of the invocation, however inappropriately, 
of th~ shield of estoppel. Appellant contends that the doctrine 
of estoppel should not be cavalierly applied as a defense to 
prevent a court from scrutinizing the validity or fairness of a 
property settlement, in the absence of any inducive conduct by 
her to the Respondent's detriment. The record is not remotely 
sufficient to support a finding that the doctrine of estoppel 
should apply in this case. 
The record would also not support any finding that the 
related equitable doctrine of laches applies. As this court 
pointed out in Leaver, supra: 
The availability of the defense of laches 
is contingent upon the establishment of 
two elements: (1) the lack of diligence 
on the part of plaintiff; and (2) an 
injury to defendant owing to such lack 
of diligence. 
State of Utah Bulletin, May 1, 1980 at 56. As argued above, the 
mere "act" of Appellant in having her prior suit dismissed, 
without prejudice, cannot serve as the basis for a finding of the 
equitable defense. To do so would totally rewrite existing law 
which governs the effect of such a dismissal order. 
The record below contains no other possible basis for 
the finding except for the fact that the Settlement Agreement 
was executed in 1973 and the Appellant filed her suit in 1977. 
-11-
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There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate the reasons fox 
\ 
this four-year wait or whether it was reasonable or justifiable 
under the circumstances. We could, of course, speculate as to a 
possible explanation for LaRae Parkes' inaction for four years: 
as a yQung mother with minor' c~ildren able to work only infre-
quently, Record, p. 0114, she was hardly in any positon to afford 
legal action. It was only when she was provided with an attorney 
paid by the public assistance off ice that she was able to seek 
a judicial division of the property. 
Speculation aside, it was the Respondent's burden 
to prove the elements of the defense he raised. This was not 
met in the case at bar merely by the establishment of a four year 
gap between the execution of the Settlement Agreement and the 
filing of Civil No. 6320. Laches is not merely delay. 
Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc.; 535 
P2d 1256, (Utah 1975); Archambault v. Sprouse, 215 s.c. 336, 55 
S.E. 2d 70 (1949). 
In addition to delay, factors considered 
by the courts in determining the existence 
or nonexistence of laches are the relative 
harm to defendant, in view of plaintiff's 
delay . . . . 
Papanikolas, supra at 1260. 
The record below contains no evidence other than delay 
on which the lower court could properly base a finding of the 
applicability of this equitable defense. In light of this, the 
findings should be reversed to prevent manifest injustice to the 
-12-
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Appellant. Papanikolas, supra; Barker v. Dunham, 342 P.2d 867 
(Utah 1959): Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430 (Utah 1970); Hall v. 
Hall, 326 P.2d 707 (Utah 1958). 
III. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EQUITABLE 
DIVISION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY BY 
THE DISTRICT COURT EVEN IF THAT 
DIVISION DIFFERS FROM THE TERMS OF 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
A. The District Court has a statutory duty to 
make an equitable distribution of the parties' 
marital property. 
Pursuant to Utah Stat. Ann. ~30-3-5, the District 
Court had the power to make custody awards and distribute the 
marital property of divorced parties. Although requested by 
Appellant to do so, the court chose not to make any independent 
determination of a fair division of the parties' marital property. 
As argued previously, the court declined to make that inquiry 
and instead misapplied the law as to estoppel and dismissal 
without prejudice. This choice, furthermore, allowed the court 
to avoid its statutory duty to order the reasonable and necessary 
distribution of the property contemplated by U.C.A. 30-3-5. 
The actual division of property is, of course, a matter 
within the judge's discretion. Absent an abuse of this discretion 
the trial courts' distribution of property will not be disturbed 
on appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, 242 E 947 (Utah 1925); Pinney v. 
Pinney, 245 P. 239 (Utah 1926). 
The lower court in the instant case never even got to 
the point of making a division of the marital property. The 
-13-
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effect of the judgment below is to rubberstamp a~ 
inequitable division contained in the agreement whereby Mr. 
Abbott received nearly everything, while Appellant received 
almost nothing. The courts implicit adoption of this inequitab. 
divisibn is an abuse of discr~tion resulting in gross injustice 
to LaRae Parkes. 
It should be noted that the lower court did not refusE 
to inquire into the child custody or support issues, despite ib 
holding that the Appellant was estopped to challenge the 
Settlement Agreement. Although that agreement set support at 
$50.00 per child monthly, the court awarded her double that 
amount in it s judgment. 
B. The District Court is not bound by 
the agreement of the parties in making 
its equitable division of marital property. 
In carrying out its authority under U.C.A. $ 30-3-5, 
the court's discretion to make a fair and equitable distributior. 
of property cannot be totally defeated by a contract or agree-
ment between the divorcing parties. Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 
779 (Utah 1961); Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). 
The same has been held with regard to parties' agreements relati 
to alimony or child support. See Callister v. Callister, 261 
P. 2d 944 (Utah 1953). The Callister explanation for this 
interpretation of U.C.A. 30-3-5 is equally applicable to propert 
agreements. In the middle of an emotional period of marriage 
breakdown or separation or divorce, the parties may agree to a 
division which, in light of all the circumstances, may be unfair 
-14-
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l\~; the Callister court pointed out, it is usually children 
or divorced wives, like LaRae Parkes,who lose out mo:;t fr•:ciuently 
in these ~greements. 
In Mathie, the Court addressed the issue of whether 
the Di~trict Court could make·a property division inconsistent 
with a contract entered into by the parties during their 
marriage. The Court emphasized that careful scrutiny should be 
given to .these agreements by the equity court before the agree-
ment is given any effect. 363 P.2d at 784. Such agreements 
should be "analyzed on their own facts and ... enforced by the 
courts only if they are fair and equitable ... " Id. 
Finally, this Court made it clear in Pearson, supra, 
that although the agreements or contracts of divorcing parties 
should be respected and given weight, the trial court is not 
bound .to adopt its terms as determinative. 561 P.2d at 1082. As 
this case demonstrates, such a rule would result in gross injustic, 
necessitating the intervention of this Court on appeal. 
Having failed to accept its duty to exercise sound 
discretion in dividing the marital property, the Judgment of the 
District Court should be overturned and an equitable distribution 
made after full hearing upon remand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, Appellant prays that this 
Honorable Court: 
-15 
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a) reverse the Findings and Judgment of the lower 
\ 
court insofar as they bar Appellant from seeking an equitable 
distribution of marital property; 
b) remand this case to the District Court for a 
' .. 
hearitig and determination of a fair and equitable distribution 
of marital property between the parties; 
c) award Appellant her costs and attorney's fees in 
prosecuting' this appeal; and 
d) award Appellant such other and further relief as 
equity and good conscience require. 
Dated: May 21, 1980, 
Respectfully submitted, 
~k<.~ 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By: Annina M. Mitchell 
352 Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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